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Abstract
We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives
(e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model,
the elected group of representatives runs a number of ballots to make final decisions regarding
various issues. The satisfaction of voters comes from the final decisions made by the elected
committee. Our results suggest that depending on a decision system used by the committee to
make these final decisions, different multi-winner election rules are most suitable for electing
the committee. Furthermore, we show that if we allow not only a committee, but also an election
rule used to make final decisions, to depend on the voters’ preferences, we can obtain an even
better representation of the voters.
1 Introduction
There are various scenarios where a group of representatives is selected to make decisions on behalf
of a larger population of voters. The examples of such situations include parliamentary elections,
elections for supervisory or faculty board, elections for the trade union, etc. In such scenarios,
the elected group of representatives, also referred to as a committee, runs a sequence of ballots
making decisions regarding various issues. For instance, these can be decisions made by the elected
parliament regarding financial economics, national health-care system, retirement age, or changes
in the specific law acts. In such case, it is natural to judge the quality of the elected committee based
on the quality of its decisions. In this paper we explore this idea and introduce new approach that
allows for a normative comparison of various multiwinner election rules.
We introduce and study a new formal model, hereinafter referred to as the voting committee
model. In this model we assume that an elected committee runs a sequence of independent bal-
lots, in which it makes collective decisions regarding a given set of issues. We assume that the
ultimate satisfaction of the voters depends solely on the final decisions made by the committee.
∗The preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence (IJCAI-2015) and on the 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in 2016 (SSCW-2016).
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Consequently, each voter ranks candidates for the committee based on how likely it is that they vote
according to his or her preferences. The voting committee model allows to numerically assess qual-
ities of committees, depending on what election rule (refered to as a decision rule) these committees
use to make the final decisions. Intuitively, the numerical quality of a committee S estimates how
likely it is that S makes decisions consistent with voters’ preferences.
There are many works that study scenarios in which a group of representatives is elected to make
certain decisions. To the best of our knowledge, however, starting with the famous Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem [11] most of these works [47, 18, 19, 32] model scenarios where there exists some
ground truth and when the decisions made by the elected committee are either objectively correct
or wrong. Thus, these models refer to the process of selecting a group of experts. Our approach is
different—there is no ground truth and the voters can differ with their opinions regarding various
issues. Informally speaking, a committee is good if it well represent voters’ subjective opinions
rather than if it can solve certain specific problems having objectively good or bad solutions.
Our Contribution
In this work we introduce a new formal probabilistic model that relates voters’ satisfactions from a
committee to their satisfactions from the committee’s decisions. In our model we define the notion
of optimality of a multi-winner election rule, given that a certain decision rule is used by the elected
committee to make the final decisions. We consider two approaches in our probabilistic voting
committee model. In the first approach we consider voters which can be correlated with respect to
their preferences regarding various issues. We study two specific cases, namely: (i) when voters
can be represented as uniformly distributed points on the interval (in such case points can represent,
for instance, positions of the corresponding voters in the left-right political spectrum), and (ii) when
preferences of voters are taken from publicly available datasets containing distributions of votes in
numerous real-life voting scenarios [27].
In this approach we use the voting committee model, and through computer simulations we
obtain several interesting conclusions. In particular, we observe that representation-focused multi-
winner election rules, such as the Chamberlin–Courant rule [9], make better decisions with respect
to voters’ preferences in comparison to the other committee selection rules that we study. Somehow
surprisingly, according to our simulations the Chamberlin–Courant rule is even superior to Pro-
portional Approval Voting, a multiwinner extension of the d’Hondt proportional method of appor-
tionment. Further, we observe that in our experiments proportional committees make significantly
better decisions than a single representative would make. Last, but not least, we argue that decisions
made by the elected committee through majority rule are better than those made by the committee
through the random dictatorship rule.
We also consider the specific case when each voter has a single, primarily important for him
or her, issue. In this case the probabilistic model collapses to the deterministic one. Here, we ob-
tain theoretical justification for the following claims. We argue that the top-K rules, i.e., scoring
rules [46] that select K candidates with the highest total score assigned by voters, are suitable for
electing committees that use the random dictatorship rule to make decisions. It might seem that
the significance of this observation is compromised by the low applicability of randomized election
rules. Such randomized decision-making processes, however, model situations where decisions are
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made by individual members of the committee but we are uncertain which issues will be considered
by which individuals. We also observe that the median OWA rule [41] is suitable for electing com-
mittees that make final decisions by majority voting. Informally speaking, in the median OWA rule
a voter is satisfied with a committee S if he or she is satisfied with at least half of the members of S.
We recall the formal definition of the class of the OWA rules in Section 4. Further, our analysis sug-
gests that representation focused multi-winner election rules are particularly well-suited for electing
committees that need to make unanimous decisions. Unanimity is often required in situations where
making a wrong decision implies severe consequences, e.g., in case of juries voting on convictions.
Indeed, in such cases we are particularly willing to ensure that minorities are represented in the
committees to avoid biased decisions.
In the second approach in our probabilistic model we consider independent voters. In such
case we prove the existence of the optimal voting rule and show how to construct one. Discussion
of this approach leads to the new very interesting concept—to the notion of a full multiwinner
rule. Informally speaking, a full multiwinner rule is the concept that allows voters to elect not only
committees, but also the rules used by these committees to make decisions. We discuss the existence
of optimal full multiwinner rules in Section 6.3.
Related Work
Our research is most closely related to the work of Koriyama et al. [24], who alike assume that
the elected committee makes a number of decisions in a sequence of ballots. In such model, they
compute the frequency, with which the will of each individual is implemented. The difference is,
however, that Koriyama et al. consider the party list setting and the problem of apportionment, i.e.,
of allocating seats to the parties according to the numbers of votes the parties receive from voters.
The authors show that certain assumptions regarding how the society evaluates the frequencies with
which the opinions of multiple individuals is implemented, justify degressive proportionality, an
interesting principle of proportional apportionment.
Similarly to our work, Casella [7, 8] considers the model where a committee meets regularly
over time to make a sequence of binary decisions. She defines Storable Votes, a multiple-issue vot-
ing system aimed at promoting rights of minorities. The strategic behavior of committee members
voting on various issues is also captured in an innovative model by Colonel Blotto games [26].
Our work extends the literature on properties of multi-winner election rules [39, 2, 14, 1, 21, 13].
This literature includes, e.g., the works of Barbera´ and Coelho [2], where the authors define prop-
erties that “good” multi-winner rules should satisfy. Elkind et al. [14] argue that the desirability of
many natural properties of multi-winner rules must be evaluated in the context of their specific ap-
plications. Our paper extends this discussion by showing an intuitive model and concrete examples
concerning this model, for which different multi-winner rules are particularly well applicable.
Similarly to Fishburn [20], we explore the idea of comparing multi-winner election systems.
Further, our perspective is conceptually close to the ones given by Christian et al. [10], who study
computational problems related to lobbying in direct democracy, where the decisions are made
directly by the voters who express their preferences in open referenda (there are no representatives).
Many multi-winner election systems are defined as functions selecting such committees that
optimize certain metrics, usually related to voters satisfaction [4, 9, 31, 5, 23, 13]. These different
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optimization metrics capture certain desired properties of election systems. Our paper complements
these works by presenting specific metrics that are motivated by the analysis of decision-making
processes of committees.
Finally, we note that there exists a broad literature on voting on multi-attribute domains, where
agents need to make collective decisions regarding a number of issues [6, 25, 44, 45]. We differ from
these works by considering an indirect process of decision-making, through an elected committee.
2 Illustrative Example
Consider a multiwinner election with six voters, eight candidates, and where the goal is to select
a committee of three representatives. Assume that for each voter there exists a single important
issue that he or she cares about; an issue can be, for instance, the decision of decreasing the taxes,
of decreasing the retirement age, or the decision of making a specific change in the national health
care system. The elected committee will vote on each issue and make decision of either accepting or
rejecting it; assume that the elected committee will make such decisions by majority voting. Further,
assume that the voters know the views of the candidates on the issues and that a voter i approves of
a candidate a if and only if i and a have the same view on the i’s important issue.
Consider example preferences of voters over candidates illustrated in Table 1a. Observe that
committee S = {c1, c2, c3} would make decisions consistent with preferences of voter i1. Indeed,
for the i1’s important issue, the majority of S, namely candidates c1 and c2, have preferences con-
sistent with i1. Similarly, for the issues important for voters i2, i3, i4 and i6, committee S would
make decisions consistent with the preferences of these voters. Informally speaking, five out of six
voters would be satisfied with the decisions made by committee S. Any other committee would
make decisions satisfying less voters. Consequently, in this scenario committee S should win the
election.
Table 1: Example of preferences of the voters over candidates. Values ’0’ and ’1’ in the fields denote
that corresponding voters approve of or disapprove of the corresponding candidates, respectively.
For instance, voter i1 in Table (a) approves of candidates c1, c2, c5, and c8. The same voter in
Table (b) approves of candidates c1 and c8.
(a)
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
i1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
i2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
i3 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
i4 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
i5 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
i6 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
(b)
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
i1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
i2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
i3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
i5 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
i6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
The above arguments can be used to design a voting rule that would be optimal for dichotomous
voters’ preferences. In such a rule, a voter i approves of a committee S if majority of the members
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of S are approved by v; the committee approved by most voters is announced as the winner. We
will formalize this argument later in Theorem 1.
Now, let us change our initial assumptions and consider the case when the elected committee
uses random dictatorship rule to make decisions regarding issues. Let us recall that according to
the random dictatorship rule, for each issue a single committee member is selected uniformly at
random, and the selected member makes a decision on the issue. Observe that in such case, voter
i1 is less satisfied with committee S = {c1, c2, c3} than before. Indeed, on i1’s important issue,
committee S will make decision consistent with i1’s preferences only with probability equal to 2/3.
The expected number of voters satisfied with the decisions made by committee S is equal to four,
and for any other committee the expected number of satisfied voters is even lower. We conclude that
in this case it is socially more beneficial if the elected committee uses majority voting rather than
random dictatorship rule. The natural question arises whether this is always the case. To answer this
question consider preferences of voters from Table 1b. For these preferences, the decisions made by
the optimal committee via majority rule will satisfy only two out of six voters. On the other hand,
committee S′ = {c1, c2, c8} using random dictatorship would satisfy, in expectation, 22/3 voters.
The above observations suggest that it is justified to consider committee selection rules where
not only the winning committee, but also the rule used by the elected committee to make decisions,
depends on the voters’ preferences. In Section 6.3 we formalize this concept, by introducing full
multiwinner rules. A full multiwinner rule is a function that given voters’ preferences returns a pair:
a given-size committee and a randomized decision rule over the set of two alternatives (accept and
reject).
In the further part of this paper we will explain how to generalize the above reasoning beyond
dichotomous preferences of the voters. Briefly speaking, we will assume that the voters do not know
how the candidates are going to vote over the issues. Instead, we will assume that each voter has
some intuition about how well he or she can be represented by a given candidate; formally, we will
assume that each voter v is able to assess the probability with which a given candidate will vote
according to v’s preferences. This captures, for instance, a common scenario where the issues are
not known in advance, thus the voters must use their beliefs to decide on how well given candidates
will represent them.
3 The Voting Committee Model
In this section we describe a voting committee model that formalizes intuitions given is Section 2,
and that allows for a normative comparison of various multi-winner election rules. For each set X,
by 1X we denote the indicator function of X, i.e., 1X(x) = 1 if x ∈ X, and 1X(x) = 0 if x /∈ X.
For simplicity, we write 1X instead of 1X(x) whenever x is clear from the context.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of voters, and let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates.
We assume there is a set D = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dr} of r issues; each issue Dj is a binary set consisting
of two alternatives Dj = {A,R}. Intuitively, the issue can be either accepted or rejected; A and R
corresponds to accepting and rejecting it, respectively. Voters have strict preferences over the alter-
natives within each issue; by dji we denote the preferred alternative from Dj from the perspective
of voter i. The issues might differ in their importance to different voters. We consider two types of
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attitudes: a voter i can consider an issue Dj either as important or as insignificant. We denote the
set of all the issues important for voter i as Dim(i) ⊆ D.
In the first stage in our model, a committee S is selected through a multi-winner election rule
Rmult; the selected committee consists of K members. In the second stage, the committee S runs
r independent ballots, for each ballot using the same (randomized) decision rule Rdec. In the i-
th ballot, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the committee makes a collective decision regarding issue Di—for Di the
committee makes either decision A or decision R. The final outcome of this two-stage process
is described by a vector of r decisions. Intuitively, the first stage of elections might correspond
to e.g., parliamentary elections, elections for supervisory or faculty board, etc. An election in the
second stage might be viewed as e.g., a parliamentary ballot on an issue regarding, e.g., financial
and monetary economics, education politics, changes in national health-care system, etc.
A multiwinner election rule Rmult takes as input a matrix of scores that voters assign to the
candidates and returns a subset of K candidates. The scores might be provided directly by the
voters or extracted from their ordinal preferences through a positional scoring function (we will
discuss this issue in more detail in the subsequent sections). A (randomized) decision rule Rdec is
a function Rdec : N → R, that for each natural number a, corresponding to the number of votes
casted on A by the committee members, returns the probability that value A is selected. We require
that Rdec is symmetric with respect to decisions A and R, i.e., that for each a, 0 ≤ a ≤ K , it holds
that Rdec(a) = 1−Rdec(K − a).
The ultimate satisfaction1 of voter i depends solely on the final outcome of the r ballots. Intu-
itively, voter i considers committee S as good, if for i’s important issues, i.e., issues from Dim(i),
S is likely to make decisions consistent with i’s preferences. The ultimate satisfaction of a voter i
from committee S is measured by value PS,Rdec(i), the probability that S makes a decision consis-
tent with i’s preferences assuming that S uses rule Rdec to make final decisions. Throughout the
paper we will consider several specific variants of the voting committee model which will differ in
a way the value PS,Rdec(i) is defined.
Let us now define the central notion of this paper that we will use in further analysis.
Definition 1. Let Rdec be a decision rule used by the committee to make final decisions, and let K
denote the size of the committee to be elected. A committee S is optimal if:
S ∈ argmaxS′⊆C:|S′|=K
∑
i
PS′,Rdec(i). (1)
In the above definition we take the utilitarian approach—the optimal rule aims at maximizing the
sum of the ultimate satisfaction of the voters. Analogously, we can define committees optimal in the
egalitarian sense, by replacing “sum” with “min” in Definition 1, optimizing the ultimate satisfac-
tion of the least satisfied voter. For the sake of concreteness, in this paper we focus on the utilitarian
case only. Definition 1 implicitly introduces the way of comparing different committees, explored
in this paper. A committee S is preferred over a committee S′ if
∑
i PS,Rdec(i) >
∑
i PS′,Rdec(i).
1We write “ultimate satisfaction” instead of “satisfaction” to distinguish these values, representing utilities that voters
get from decisions of a committee from the scores that voters assign to individual candidates, and which quantify the
level of appreciation of voters to individuals.
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4 Overview of Election Rules
In this section we recall definitions of several known decision and multi-winner election rules that
we use in our further analysis.
4.1 Decision Rules
We recall that a (randomized) decision rule Rdec is a function Rdec : N → R, that for each natural
number a, corresponding to the number of votes casted on A (accept), returns the probability that
the value A will be selected. We recall that we require Rdec to be symmetric, that is for each a,
0 ≤ a ≤ K , it must hold that Rdec(a) = 1 − Rdec(K − a). Below we recall the definition of
popular decision rules that we will use in our analysis.
The uniformly random dictatorship rule selects an alternative d with probability proportional
to the number of committee members who vote for d. The majority rule deterministically selects
A if at least half of the committee members vote for A (in order to avoid issues related to tie-
breaking, we will always use the majority rule for the odd number of votes). Additionally, we
consider one rule which is not symmetric with respect to decisions A and R—the unanimity rule
returns deterministically A if and only if all committee members vote for A.
4.2 Multiwinner Election Rules
For the description of multiwinner rules we assume that voters express their preferences over can-
didates by providing scores: for a voter i and candidate c, by ui,c we denote the score that i assigns
to c. Intuitively, ui,c quantifies the level of appreciation of voter i for candidate c. In the description
of our results in the subsequent sections we will discuss where these scores come from, and their
specific structure. There are two particularly interesting types of scores:
Approval scores. We say that scores are approvals if for each voter i and each candidate c, we have
ui,c ∈ {0, 1}. We call the setting with approval scores the approval model. In the approval
model, we say that a voter i approves of a candidate c if ui,c = 1. Otherwise we say that i
disapproves of c.
Borda scores. In the model with Borda scores, for each voter i and each candidate c, we have
ui,c ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, and ui,c 6= ui,c′ for each c 6= c′. In other words, each voter assigns his
or her most preferred candidate score of m− 1, to his or her second most preferred candidate
score of m− 2, etc. One way in which the Borda scores can be elicitated, is by asking voters
for their rankings of candidates, and by applying Borda positional scoring functions to such
ordinal preferences (cf. the work of Young [46]).
A score profile is a matrix of the scores of all voters over all candidates. We denote the set of all
score profiles as U . For each j ∈ N, by Pj(S) we denote the set of all subsets of S of size j.
We refer to the elements of PK(C) as to committees. A multi-winner election rule is a function
Rmult : U → PK(C) that for a given score profile of voters returns a committee of size K .
A significant part of results provided in this paper concerns OWA rules (OWA stands for
an ordered weighted average operator). OWA rules in the context of approval model were first
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mentioned in the 19th century in the early works of Danish astronomer and mathematician Thor-
vald N. Thiele [43] and than generalized to arbitrary score profiles by Skowron et al. [41]. Below, we
recall the definition of this remarkably general class of rules and describe several concrete examples
of OWA rules.
For each voter i, each committee S, and each number j, 1 ≤ j ≤ K , let ui,S(j) de-
note the score of the j-th most preferred candidate from S, according to i. In other words:
{ui,S(1), . . . , ui,S(K)} = {ui,c : c ∈ S}, and ui,S(1) ≥ · · · ≥ ui,S(K). For instance, ui,S(1)
is the score that i assigns to his or her most preferred candidate in S, ui,S(2) is the score that i
assigns to his or her second most preferred candidate in S, etc. For each voter i, each committee
S, and each K-element vector α = 〈α1, . . . , αK〉, we define the α-satisfaction of i from S as the
ordered weighted average (OWA) of the scores of the members of S:
α(i, S) =
K∑
j=1
αjui,S(j).
The α-rule selects a committee S that maximizes total α-satisfaction of the voters
∑
i α(i, S).
Intuitively, the α vector provides a way of aggregating scores of the individual members of the
committee to obtain the score of the committee as the whole. Indeed, many known multiwinner
rules are in fact OWA rules:
Top-K rule and K-Borda rule. If αTopK = 〈1, 1, . . . , 1〉 we get a top-K rule that selects K can-
didates with the highest total scores. Such rules are referred to as the weakly separable
rules [14]. For Borda scores, the top-K rule collapses to the well known K-Borda rule [13].
Chamberlin–Courant rule. Chamberlin–Courant rule [9] is an OWA rule defined by the weight
vector αCC = 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉. Informally speaking, according to Chamberlin and Courant a
voter cares only about his or her most preferred candidate in the committee; such a most
preferred candidate is a representative of the voter in the elected committee. Initially, Cham-
berlin and Courant defined their rule for Borda scores. Using Chamberlin–Courant rule in
the approval model was first suggested by Thiele [43]. Elkind et al. [14] considered the
Chamberlin–Courant rule for different types of score profiles, and refer to these types of rules
as representation focussed rules [14].
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV is defined as an OWA rule with the weight vector
αPAV = 〈1, 1/2, . . . , 1/K〉. This rule, developed by Thiele, has been used for a short pe-
riod in Sweden during early 1900’s. This specific sequence of harmonic weights ensures a
certain level of proportionality of the rule [23, 1]; as a matter of fact, PAV is often considered
as an extension of the d’Hondt method of apportionment [35] to the case when voters can
vote for individual candidates rather than for political parties.
k-median rule. The k-median rule is the OWA rule defined by the vector α which has 1 on the k-th
positions and 0 on the others. In other words, according to the k-median rule, the satisfaction
of a voter from a committee S is his or her satisfaction from the k-th most preferred member
of S.
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The class of OWA-based rules captures many other interesting election systems such as top-K-
counting rules [17], separable rules [14] etc. For more discussion on OWA based rules and their
applications beyond voting systems we refer the reader to the work of Skowron et al. [41].
Sequential OWA Rules. Unfortunately, for many OWA-based rules, finding the winners is a com-
putationally hard problem2. Sequential OWA rules form an appealing, computationally easy, alter-
native for OWA rules. Let α denote the vector of K weights. The sequential α-rule proceeds as
follows. It starts with an empty solution S = ∅, and in each of the K consecutive steps it adds to
S the candidate that increases the α-satisfaction of the voters most. Usually, sequential OWA rules
provide a good way of approximating their optimal counterparts [41], sometimes exhibiting even
more interesting properties than the original OWA rules [14].
5 Correlated Voters in the Voting Committee Model
In this section we consider voters which are not independent with respect to their preferences over
the set of issues. We start our analysis by considering voters and candidates which can be rep-
resented as points on the line of preferences. The concept of representing voters and candidates
as points in the Euclidean space dates back to 1966 [12, 33], and since than, due to its many
natural interpretations, it received a considerable amount of attention in the social choice litera-
ture [15, 16, 29, 30, 38].
Let us consider the following illustrative example. Consider the population where one third of
voters are left-wing and these voters are represented on the line by point 0, one third are right-wing
and represented by point 1, and one third are centrists and represented by point 1/2. There are
three issues L, C, and R: the left-wing voters would like L accepted, R rejected, and they do not
care about C; the right-wing voters would like R accepted, L rejected, and they consider issue C
insignificant; the centrists voters only care about C being accepted. A left-wing candidate will vote
for accepting L, C and R with probabilities 1, 1/2, and 0, respectively. A right-wing candidate will
vote for accepting these issues with probabilities 0, 1/2, and 1, respectively. A centrist candidate
will vote for accepting them with probabilities 1/2, 1, and 1/2, respectively. In particular, left-wing
voters are perfectly represented by left-wing candidates and perfectly misrepresented by right-wing
candidates. Consider the two committees: S which consists of a left-wing, a centrist, and a right-
wing candidate, and Q that consists of three centrist candidates.
Proportional committee S Centrist committee Q
The probability that committee S makes decision consistent with preferences of left-wing voters
is equal to 1/2. The same probability for right-wing voters is also equal to 1/2, and for the centrists
voters to 3/4 (the probability that at least one of the two committee members, the left-wing or the
2Computational hardness of the Chamberlin–Courant rule was first proved by Procaccia et al. [34]. Betzler et al. [3]
showed that this problem is also hard from the perspective of parameterized complexity theory. For arguments referring
to other weight vectors we refer the reader to to the work of Skowron et al. [41]
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right-wing, will vote for accepting issue C). The ultimate satisfaction of the voters from committee
S is thus equal to n/3 · (1/2 + 1/2 + 3/4). The centrist committee Q, however, will make decision
consistent with left-wing, centrist and right-wing voters with probabilities equal to 1/2, 1, and 1/2,
respectively. Thus, committee Q results in a higher ultimate satisfaction of the voters. The surpris-
ing conclusion of the above example is that the centrist committee, in some situations, can represent
the voters better than the proportional one. In particular, this example shows that it is not clear
how the best decision-making committee should be aligned on the preference line. Below, we will
explore this idea further, we will argue that the described phenomenon is specific to our example,
and that in the considered cases the proportional committee is usually, in some sense, superior.
5.1 Uniform Distribution on the Euclidean Line
Let us first consider the case where voters and candidates are uniformly distributed on the [0, 1]
interval. For this distribution with n = 500 voters and m = 500 candidates, we run the following
computer simulations:
1. For each voter v we assumed that there exists one issue which can be represented on the line
by the same point as the corresponding voter.
2. For each issue i we uniformly at random selected a value p ∈ [3/2, 5/2]. Intuitively, values of
p closer to 3/2 make the issue more likely to be preferred by a majority of voters, thus such an
issue can be considered as objectively desired. Values of p closer to 5/2 suggest that the issue
is likely to be preferred only by a minority of voters. Specifically, for each voter and for each
candidate we randomly selected their preference over the issue. For an issue i and a voter (or
a candidate) x we took 1− p · |i− x| as the probability of x accepting i, where |i− x| is the
distance between points corresponding to i and x on the line. In particular, each voter always
accepts his or her corresponding issue; further, for p = 2 and a centrist issue i, in expectation
half of the voters (and half of the candidates) accept i.
3. For each issue we computed decisions made by different committees with respect to such
issues, and we assigned to each voter v the satisfaction equal to the fraction of issues for each
a given committee made decisions consistent with v’s preferences.
4. We repeated such experiment 500 times and for each voter we computed the average ultimate
satisfaction.
In these simulations we considered five different committees. Three of the considered committees
consisted of 51 candidates and were selected by the top-K rule, and by the sequential variants of
PAV, and Chamberlin–Courant rules. To compute committees according to these rules, we assumed
that the scores that voters assign to candidates are proportional to one minus the distance between
the respective points. For a better intuition, below we depict example committees returned by the
three considered multiwinner election rules (for the sake of readability of the diagram, below we
depict the case of 10 rather than 51 committee members).
Further, we considered one committee that consisted of a single centrist candidate, and one com-
mittee that consisted of all voters, i.e., the committee which represents the direct democracy—the
10
Chamberlin–Courant PAV Top-K
case where all decisions are made in referenda. Finally, we considered two different decision rules
that the elected committees used to make final decisions with respect to issues (cf. point 3 above),
namely the majority rule and the random dictatorship rule.
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Figure 1: The results of the simulations for voters and candidates uniformly distributed on the
Euclidean interval [0, 1]. All issues are important. Points on the x-axis correspond to voters.
The results of our simulations are depicted in Figure 1. Our conclusions are the following:
1. For the case of majority rule, the committee elected by PAV strictly dominates the single-
winner committee. This justifies the decision of selecting a collective body rather than en-
trusting the whole power to a single representative. Further, this observation suggest a conjec-
ture that an analogous variant of Condorcet’s jury theorem can be formulated for the voting
committee model. We recall that the main difference is that in our model there is no absolute
criterion suggesting that some voter is right or wrong with respect to a given issue. Even for
a high value of parameter p (cf. point 2 in the description of simulations), where the issue is
relatively unpopular, a voter who is close to such issue will still prefer it to be accepted.
2. The areas below the plots for all four multiwinner committees are almost the same. Yet, the
committee selected by the Chamberlin–Courant rule ensures more fairness to the voters; the
two remaining multiwinner rules tend to favor centrist voters. This observation suggests the
conjecture that the distribution of the members of the elected committee in a spatial model
should resemble the distribution of the voters.
3. Decisions made by the majority rule are in expectation better than decisions made by the
random dictatorship rule.
Next, we wanted to check how the intensities of voters’ preferences are reflected in the voting
committee model. Intuitively, a voter has stronger feelings about issues which are either very close
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to him or her, or which are far away on the line of preferences. A voter cares more about decisions
made with respect to such issues in comparison to issues for which he or she is relatively indifferent.
We modeled intensities of voters’ preferences by introducing insignificant issues to our simulations.
For an issue i and voter v we assumed that i is insignificant for v if p · |i−x| ∈ [2/5, 3/5]—intuitively,
in such case i is insignificant because the probabilities of v willing to accept and reject the issue
are relatively similar. The results of simulations with this modification showed almost the same
shapes as in Figure 1. These results confirm our previous conclusions. Even more, in this case
the area below the plot for the Chamberlin–Courant committee was by 4% larger than for the top-
K committee. This suggests that the Chamberlin–Courant committee is not only more fair to the
voters, but it is also superior to the centrist committee with respect to the total satisfaction of voters.
5.2 Simulations With Datasets Describing Real-Life Preferences
As the next step we run simulations for numerous datasets describing people’s preferences. To this
end we used PrefLib [27], a reference library of preference data. PrefLib contains over 300 datasets
describing different scenarios where voters have (weak) preferences over candidates. We filtered
out datasets with less than 15 voters and with less than 20 candidates. For each of the remaining
datasets we run the following procedure:
1. For each voter v we introduced one issue iv.
2. For an issue iv and each voter v′ we computed the Kendal-Tau distance [22] between rankings
v′ and v. We scaled these distances so that the average distance between iv and all voters was
equal to 1/2. For each candidate c we defined the distance between iv and c as the position
of c in v’s preference ranking. We also scaled these distances so that the average distance
between iv and all candidates was equal to 1/2.
3. We selected a value p, uniformly at random from the interval [0, 3]. For each issue i and for
each voter (respectively, each candidate) x we randomly selected their preference over the
issue. We took 1 − p · |i − x| as the probability of x accepting i, where |i − x| denotes the
scaled distance between the voter (the candidate) and the issue, defined in the previous point.
4. Similarly as in Section 5.1, we computed decisions made by different committees with respect
to different issues, and for each voter v we computed the average fraction of issues for each a
given committee made decisions consistent with v’s preferences.
5. We repeated such experiment 10 times and for each voter we computed the average ultimate
satisfaction.
To compute the five winning committees, we took scores that voters assign to candidates, which
were extracted from their ordinal preferences by using the Borda positional scoring function.
The results of these experiments are depicted in Figure 2. Since in this case the voters are not
represented by points on the line, in Figure 2 we sorted the voters according to the their ultimate
satisfactions. For instance a point on the blue line with x- and y- coordinates equal to 0.8 and
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Figure 2: The results of the simulations for PrefLib [27].
0.7 respectively, denotes that 80% of voters had ultimate satisfaction below 0.7, and 20% of voters
above 0.7.
The results of these simulations confirm our conclusions from Section 5.1. One significant
difference is that now, we can objectively claim the Chamberlin–Courant rule to be superior, not
only with respect to the fairness, but also with respect to the total ultimate satisfaction of the voters.
5.3 Single Issue & Deterministic Case: Theoretical Results
In this subsection we consider scenarios where each voter has a single important issue that is known
in advance, and where voters know preferences of the candidates over the issues. Thus, when
electing a committee, it is most natural to consider approval scores of the voters over candidates—a
voter i approves of a candidate c only if the preference of c over the i’s important issue is consistent
with the preference of the voter. We recall that if a voter i approves of a candidate c, we say that it
assigns to c score equal to 1, and denote it by ui,c = 1. Otherwise, we say that he or she assigns
to c score of 0, and denote it by ui,c = 0. These scores form an input for the multiwinner election
rule Rmult, and thus they can be viewed as the only information that rule Rmult can use to select a
committee of K representatives.
We recall that for each committee S, and for each voter i, by PS,Rdec(i) we denote the prob-
ability that S makes a decision consistent with i’s preferences, and that we consider PS,Rdec(i)
the ultimate satisfaction of voter i from committee S. Since we consider the model with approval
scores, it holds that:
PS,Rdec(i) = Rdec
(∑
c∈S ui,c
)
.
In our subsequent discussion we will show that several known multi-winner election rules can
be viewed as optimal in the deterministic variant of our voting committee model. Each such a rule is
optimal for different decision system Rdec, used by the selected committee to make final decisions.
Thus, our results give intuition regarding the applicability of different multi-winner election rules,
depending on for what kind of decision making the committee is elected for.
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Definition 2. Let Rdec be a decision rule used in the second stage of the election model. A multi-
winner election rule Rmult is optimal for Rdec if for each preferences of voters it elects an optimal
committee.
Below, we explain which multiwinner rules are optimal for majority, random dictatorship, and
unanimity decision systems.
Theorem 1. Assume K is odd. In the deterministic model: (i) the K+12 -median election system is
optimal for the majority rule, and (ii) the top-K rule is optimal for the random dictatorship rule.
Proof. We start by considering the case when Rdec is the majority rule. We calculate PS,Rdec(i),
the ultimate satisfaction of a voter i from a committee S, assuming S uses majority rule to make
final decisions. A committee member c ∈ C votes according to i’s preferences if and only if c is
approved by i. Thus, a committee S makes decisions consistent with i’s preferences, if it contains
at least K+12 members approved by i. The satisfaction PS,Rdec(i) of i from S is equal to 1 if S
contains at least K+12 members approved by i, otherwise it is equal to 0.
The same formula defines satisfaction of i from S in the K+12 -median election system. Fi-
nally, we note that in the K+12 -median election system, the committee that maximizes voters’ total
satisfaction is selected.
Let us now move to the case when Rdec is the random dictatorship rule. For a committee S, let
apprvi(S) denote the number of candidates from S that are approved of by i. For each committee
S, and each member c ∈ S the probability that during the uniformly random dictatorship ballot
regarding the issue, the final decision will be made by the committee member c is equal to 1/K. The
probability that S will make decision according to i’s preferences is, thus, equal to:
PS,Rdec(i) =
∑
c∈S
1
K
· 1i approves of c =
apprvi(S)
K
.
Consequently, a committee S is optimal if it maximizes the value of the formula
∑
i apprvi(S).
Exactly such committee is elected by the top-K rule.
Theorem 1 is quite powerful in a sense that it claims the optimality of the K+12 -median and
top-K multi-winner rules, for the corresponding decision rules, irrespectively of the preferences
of the voters over the issues. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, which is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 1. Consider an election with two voters, three candidates, and where the goal is to select
a committee with two candidates (K = 2). Assume the elected committee will use the unanimity
rule to make decisions on issues. Further, assume the deterministic model with two issues, D1 and
D2; issue D1 is important only for voter i1 and issue D2 only for voter i2. Consider preferences of
the voters and of the candidates over issues given in the left table below.
i1 i2 c1 c2 c3
D1 R R R A
D2 R A A R
i1 i2 c1 c2 c3
D1 A A A R
D2 A R R A
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Observe that voter i1 approves of candidates c1 and c2 and that voter i2 approves of candidate
c3. In this case the optimal committee would be {c1, c3} or {c2, c3}. Both committees will reject
both issues, and so they will satisfy both voters. Now, consider the preferences from the right table.
Similarly as before, in this case voter i1 approves of candidates c1 and c2 and voter i2 approves of
candidate c3. However, in this case the optimal committee is {c1, c2}. This committee will accept
issue D1, hence satisfy one voter. Any other committee will reject both issues satisfying no voter.
Example 1 suggests that for the unanimity rule there exists no optimal multiwinner election
method. This is an artifact of the fact that unanimity is not symmetric with respect to decisions A
and R. For the unanimity rule we can obtain a much weaker claim, yet our claim will also have an
interesting interpretation. Before we proceed further, we introduce two new definitions that describe
two extreme classes of voters’ preferences over the issues. We say that voters are rejection-oriented
if for each voter i, di = R, meaning that each voter gets satisfaction only from rejecting issues.
Analogously, we say that the voters are acceptance-oriented if for each voter i, di = A.
Proposition 1. For the unanimity system in the deterministic model: (i) the Chamberlin–Courant
system with approval votes is optimal for rejection-oriented voters, and (ii) the K-median system
with approval votes is optimal for acceptance-oriented voters.
Proof. We provide the proof for rejection-oriented voters. The proof for acceptance-oriented voters
is analogous. Our reasoning is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The ultimate satisfaction of
a voter i from a committee S, PS,Rdec(i), is equal to 1 if S contains at least one candidate approved
by i, and is equal to 0 otherwise. This is equivalent to the definition of voters’ satisfaction in the
Chamberlin–Courant election rule, which completes the proof.
Proposition 1 suggest that Chamberlin–Courant rule and K-median rule are suitable for electing
committees that have veto rights. One should choose one of them depending on the voters’ satis-
faction model. For instance, if passing a wrong decision has much more severe consequences than
rejecting a good one (which is captured by modeling the voters as rejection-oriented), a committee
should be selected with Chamberlin–Courant rule, and it should use unanimity rule to make final
decisions. This is very often the case when there exists a well established status quo which should
be changed only in indisputable cases. On the other hand, if passing a wrong decision has relatively
low cost compared to rejecting a good one, the committee should be selected with K-median rule.
6 Independent Voters: Theoretical Analysis
In this section we consider voters whose preferences over issues can be viewed as independent
random variables. We will show that if the voters are independent, there exist optimal rules, also in
the nondeterministic case. In what it follows, we relax two assumptions from Section 5.3. First, we
assume that each voter can consider multiple issues as important. Second, we assume that the voters
do not know how the candidates are going to vote. Nevertheless, they are provided with some form
of intuition which allows them to recognize that some candidates would better represent them in the
elected committee than others. To capture this intuition, for each voter i and each candidate c we
define the probability of representation of i by c, denoted by pi,c. This is the probability that c will
15
vote according to i’s preferences on an i’s important issue. We write qi,c = (1−pi,c). Clearly, value
pi,c measures how well i feels represented by c, thus we say that voter i assigns score ui,c = pi,c to
candidate c. These scores are given as an input to the multiwinner election rule Rmult.
Further, for each voter i, each important for i issue Dj ∈ Dim(i), each committee S, and each
committee vote v ∈ DKj , let PS(v) denote the probability that members of S cast vote v:
PS(v) =
∏
c∈S
(
1
v[j]=dji
pi,c + 1v[j] 6=dji
qi,c
)
.
Recall that Rdec : N → R is a randomized decision rule used by the committee to make decisions
over issues. By PRdec(i|v) we denote the probability that the ruleRdec, given vote v, makes decision
dij , i.e., decision consistent with i’s preferences:
PRdec(i|v) = 1dji=A
Rdec
(∑
d∈v
1d=A
)
+ 1
dji=R
(
1−Rdec
(∑
d∈v
1d=A
))
= 1
dji=A
Rdec
(∑
d∈v
1d=A
)
+ 1
dji=R
(
Rdec
(∑
d∈v
1d=R
))
= Rdec
(∑
d∈v
1
d=dji
)
.
We recall that for each committee S, each voter i, and each important issue Dj ∈ Dim(i), by
PS,Rdec(i) we denote the probability that S makes decision consistent with i’s preferences. Thus:
PS,Rdec(i) =
∑
v∈DKj
PS(v)PRdec(i|v).
PS,Rdec(i) can be also viewed as the expected fraction of issues important for i, for which the
committee C would make decisions consistent with i’s preferences. Similarly as in the deterministic
model, we will call PS,Rdec(i) the ultimate satisfaction of a voter i from the committee S.
Example 2. Consider the illustrative example from Section 5 where one third of voters are left-wing,
one third are right-wing, and one third are centrists. Recall that left-wing, right-wing, and centrists
candidates can be represented by points 0, 1/2, and 1 on the line, respectively. For this example the
probability of representation pi,c is equal to pi,c = 1− d(i, c), where d(i, c) is the distance between
the points corresponding to voter i and candidate c.
The approval model is a special case of the probabilistic model where there are only two “al-
lowed” values of scores. Thus, in the approval model we assume that there exists two values
p, q ∈ [0, 1] with q = p−1, such that for each voter i and each candidate cwe have pi,c, qi,c ∈ {p, q}.
This model captures scenarios when each voter can view each candidate as belonging to one of the
two extreme categories: each candidate can be either “good” or “bad” from i’s point of view. This
model is appealing because in many real-life scenarios the voters express their preferences by as-
signing candidates to one of the two groups: either by approving or by disapproving them.
16
In contrast to the previous section, here we assume that the scores that the voters assign to
candidates are scaled: we assume that a voter i assigns score 1 to candidate c if pi,c = p and score
0 if pi,c = q. These scores will be given as an input to the multiwinner election rule Rmult. The
fact that we use rescaled scores will not affect our further results, but will enable us to use a more
readable notation.
6.1 Optimality of Known Decision Rules under Approval Voting
We start our analysis with the approval model, i.e., from the case when the voters have two types
of scores only. We start by observing that the characterization of the optimal rule for the random
dictatorship method from Theorem 1 can be generalized to the approval model.
Proposition 2. The top-K rule is optimal for the random dictatorship rule in the approval model.
Proof. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, for a committee S we define apprvi(S) as the
number of candidates from S that are approved by i. Let p and q denote the probabilities of repre-
sentation of i by candidates approved of and disapproved of by i, respectively. Naturally, p > q.
For each committee S, and each member c ∈ S the probability that during the uniformly random
dictatorship ballot regarding an issue, the final decision will be made by the committee member c,
is equal to 1/K. The probability that S will make decision according to i’s preferences is equal to:
PS,Rdec(i) =
∑
c∈S
1
K
· (p1i approves of c + q1i disapproves of c)
= apprvi(S) ·
p
K
+ (K − apprvi(S)) ·
q
K
= apprvi(S) ·
p− q
K
+ q.
Consequently, a committee S is optimal if it maximizes
∑
i apprvi(S). Exactly such committee is
elected by the top-K rule.
Below, we show a more general result that characterizes a class of optimal election systems.
Theorem 2. For each decision rule Rdec, there exists a K-element vector α, such that α-rule is
optimal for Rdec in the approval model.
Proof. Let Sℓ,i denote a committee that has exactly ℓ members approved by i, and let P(i, s, ℓ) be
the probability that exactly s members of Sℓ,i will vote accordingly to i’s preferences. We have:
P(i, s, ℓ) =
K∑
x=1
1x≤ℓ1x≤s1s−x≤K−ℓ ·
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x
(
K − ℓ
s− x
)
qs−xpK−ℓ−s+x.
We can see that P(i, s, ℓ) does not depend on i. Further, let PRdec(i|s) be the probability that the
rule Rdec makes decision consistent with i’s preferences on issue Dj , assuming s members of Sℓ,i
vote accordingly to i’s preferences.
PRdec(i|s) = Rdec(s)1dji=A
+ (1−Rdec(K − s))1dji=R
.
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Since either dji = A or d
j
i = R and since Rdec(s) = (1 −Rdec(K − s)), we get that PRdec(i|s) =
Rdec(s), and thus PRdec(i|s) does not depend on i. Consequently, we can calculate the ultimate
satisfaction PSℓ,i,Rdec(i) of a voter i from a committee Sℓ,i, so that this value does not depend on i:
PSℓ,i,Rdec(i) =
K∑
s=1
P(i, s, ℓ)PRdec(i|s).
Because PSℓ,i,Rdec(i) does not depend on i, we will denote it as PSℓ,Rdec . Naturally, since p ≥ q,
we have PSℓ+1,Rdec ≥ PSℓ,Rdec , for each ℓ. Now, we can see that the following vector:
α =
〈
PS1,Rdec , (PS2, Rdec − PS1,Rdec), (PS3,Rdec − PS2,Rdec),
. . . , (PSK ,Rdec − PSK−1,Rdec)〉
satisfies the requirement from the thesis. Indeed, in the α-rule the satisfaction of a voter from a
committee with ℓ approved members is the sum of first ℓ coefficients of α, which is PCℓ,Rdec . This
completes the proof.
The above theorem can be viewed as an evidence of the expressiveness and power of OWA
election rules. Unfortunately, OWA election rules are not sufficiently expressive to describe the
non-approval model, which we address in the next subsection.
6.2 Optimality of Known Decision Rules under Probabilistic Model
Let us move to the probabilistic model in its full generality.
To get characterization similar to the one given in Theorem 2, but for arbitrary scores, we would
need to consider a more general class of election rules, that is rules in which the satisfaction of a
single voter i from a committee C is expressed as a linear combination of products of i’ scores as-
signed to individuals, i.e., as a linear combination of the values from the set
{∏
c∈C′ ui,c : C
′ ⊆ C
}
(in contrast to a linear combination of scores only). Such rules that consider inseparable committees
were considered e.g., by Ratliff [37, 36]. We formalize this observation in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. LetRdec : N→ R be the rule that the elected committee S uses to make final decisions.
Let us consider the function v : PK(C)×Πn(C)→ R defined in the following way:
v(S, 〈ui〉i∈N ) =
∑
i∈N
|S|∑
j=1
Rdec(j)
∑
Sap⊆Pj(S)
( ∏
c∈Sap
ui,c
∏
c/∈Sap
(
1− ui,c
))
, (2)
The rule that for each score profile 〈ui〉i∈N selects the committee C that maximizes v(C, 〈ui〉i∈N )
is optimal for Rdec.
Proof. The thesis follows from the fact that v(C, 〈ui〉i∈N ) is the sum of ultimate expected satis-
factions over all voters. Indeed, for each possible value of j representing the number of committee
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members voting according to i’s preferences, the expression:
∑
Sap⊆Pj(S)
( ∏
c∈Sap
ui,c
∏
c/∈Sap
(
1− ui,c
))
gives the probability that exactly j committee members will vote according to i’s preferences. In the
above formula Sap represents the set of j committee members who vote according to i’s preferences.
Nevertheless, for the case of the uniformly random dictatorship rule used to make final deci-
sions, we can get a result similar to the one given in Proposition 2 even for the case of arbitrary
scores.
Proposition 3. Top-K rule is optimal for the random dictatorship rule in the probabilistic model.
Proof. The reasoning is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The probability that a committee S
will vote according to i’s preferences is equal to:
PS,Rdec(i) =
1
K
∑
c∈S
pi,c.
The rule that maximizes the total score of selected candidates, also maximizes their total expected
ultimate satisfaction. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3 gives us a constructive way of defining an optimal rule in the most general case.
Unfortunately, such rule is often hard to compute. We briefly discuss computational issues in Ap-
pendix A.
6.3 Optimality of Full Multiwinner Rules
In the previous subsection we studied the optimality of multi-winner election rules, given infor-
mation on what decision system the committee will use to make final decisions. In this section
we show that in our probabilistic model we can compare qualities of the pairs of multi-winner and
decision systems. Thus, our results not only suggest which multi-winner election rule is suitable
for electing a committee, but also indicates which decision rule should be used by the committee
to make final decisions. We start with introducing the definition of the full multiwinner rule. This
definition introduces a novel concept to the literature on social choice: it allows the voters to elect
not only committees, but also decision rules that these committees use to make final decisions.
Definition 3. Let SW be the set of all symmetric randomized decision rules. A full multiwinner
rule is a function F : Π → P(A) × SW that for each score profile π ∈ Π returns a pair F(π) =
(S,Rdec), where S ∈ P(C) is the elected committee, and Rdec ∈ SW is the decision rule that S
will use when making final decisions. We use the notation F(π)[1] = S and F(π)[2] = Rdec.
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Below we define a partial order on full multiwinner rules. This definition provides a way to
compare full multiwinner rules, in particular it allows us to extend the concept of optimality to full
multiwinner rules.
Definition 4. A full multiwinner rule F weakly dominates a full multiwinner rule G, if for each
score profile π ∈ Π(N), F returns a committee and a decision rule that gives the total expected
ultimate satisfaction of the voters at least as high as the one given by a committee and a decision
rule returned by G: ∑
i
PF(π)[1],F(π)[2](i) ≥
∑
i
PG(π)[1],G(π)[2](i). (3)
F strongly dominates G for P if it weakly dominates G and if there exists profile π ∈ Π for which
Inequality (3) is strict. A full multiwinner rule F is optimal if it weakly dominates every other full
multiwinner rule.
In the previous sections we assumed that the decision rule used by the committee is fixed, and
that we use voters’ preferences only to determine the winning committee of K candidates. This
traditional definition can be mapped to the new model.
Definition 5. For a multi-winner rule Rmult and a decision rule Rdec, by Rmult followed by Rdec
we call the full multiwinner rule that selects committee using Rmult and, independently of voters’
preferences, always uses Rdec to make final decisions.
Now, we show how to apply Definition 4 in perhaps the simplest variant, that is in the deter-
ministic model. First, we define a new election rule COMB as a combination of K+12 -median rule
followed by majority rule with the K-approval rule followed by the random dictatorship rule.
Definition 6. The rule COMB is defined as follows. Let S and S′ be committees elected by K-
approval rule and by K+12 -median rule, respectively. Let apprv be the total approval score of S
and let owa be the total OWA score of S′. If apprvK > owa, then COMB returns the pair (C , random
dictatorship). Otherwise, COMB returns the pair (C ′, majority).
It is remarkable that with this simple idea we obtained the new rule, COMB, that strongly dom-
inates both rules that it is derived from.
Proposition 4. In the deterministic model, COMB strongly dominates K+12 -median followed by
majority, and K-approval followed by random dictatorship.
Proof. Let apprv and owa be defined as in Definition 6. Repeating the analysis from the proofs
of Theorems 1 and Proposition 2, we get that the total ultimate satisfaction of voters under K+12 -
median followed by majority is equal to owa, and that the total ultimate satisfaction of voters under
K-approval followed by random dictatorship is equal to apprvK . The total ultimate satisfaction of
voters and under COMB is equal to max(apprvK , owa). It is easy to see that there exist profiles where
apprv
K is strictly greater than owa and vice versa. This completes the proof.
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The natural question is whether we can find an optimal rule in our general probabilistic model.
Interestingly, for the deterministic model the answer is positive. The question whether this result
can be extended to the general probabilistic model is still open.
Theorem 4. In the deterministic model there exists an optimal full multiwinner rule.
Proof. The proof is constructive. We recall that a single-winner rule Rdec can be described by
K values Rdec(1), . . . ,Rdec(K). We use notation from the proof of Theorem 2; let Sℓ,i denote a
committee that has exactly ℓ members approved by i, and let P(i, s, ℓ) denote the probability that
exactly s members of Sℓ,i will vote accordingly to i’s preferences.
In the deterministic model P(i, s, ℓ) = 1s=ℓ. Consequently, for a committee Sℓ,i with ℓ ap-
proved members, we have PSℓ,i,Rdec = Rdec(ℓ). Let 1ℓ,i denote a function such that 1ℓ,i(S) = 1 if
S contains ℓ elements approved by i, and 1ℓ,i(S) = 0 otherwise. For a given committee S we can
find an optimal decision rule Rdec by solving the following linear program:
maximize
∑
i∈N
PS,Rdec(i) =
∑
i∈N
Rdec(ℓ)1i approves ℓ elements of S
subject to:
(a) : Rdec(ℓ+ 1) ≥ Rdec(ℓ), 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ K − 1
(b) : 0 ≤ Rdec(ℓ) ≤ 1, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ K
(c) : Rdec(ℓ) = 1−Rdec(K − ℓ), 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ K
(c) :
K∑
ℓ=1
Rdec(ℓ) = 1.
The optimal full multiwinner rule tries all committees and selects such that gives the best so-
lution to the integer program. From the solution of the integer program we can extract values
Rdec(1), . . . ,Rdec(K) that describe the optimal decision rule that should be used to make final
decisions.
7 Discusion & Conclusion
We defined a new model, called the voting committee model, which explores scenarios where a
group of representatives is elected to make decisions on behalf of the voters. This model links
utilities of the voters from the elected committee to their utilities from the committee’s decisions
regarding various matters. Intuitively, a satisfaction of voter i from a committee S is proportional to
the probability that for the issues important for i, S’s decisions are consistent with i’s preferences.
Our results give positive support for employing representation-focused multiwinner election
rules—indeed under several assumptions, the decisions made by such committees reflect the pref-
erences of the population best. Most importantly, however, our model introduces a new framework
for normative comparison of multiwinner voting rules. Indeed, the analysis presented in this paper
can be repeated for more specific scenarios, where the relation between voters’ preferences over
candidates and respective probabilities of representation exhibits some specific structure.
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We introduced the notion of a full multiwinner rule, in which voters elect a decisive committee
along with the decision rule to be used. Under some assumptions, we showed that there exists an
optimal full multiwinner rule and we described the way how it can be constructed. We believe that
this is an interesting concept that deserves further attention.
Among many natural open questions, there is one we consider particularly appealing: is it
possible to provide theoretical analysis suggesting which committee is the best for the case of spatial
model, such as the one considered in Section 5?
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A Computational Aspects of Comparing Committees
Unfortunately, finding optimal committees is often computationally hard. For example, the problem
of finding winners under Chamberlin–Courant rule is known to be NP-hard [34] and hard from
the point of view of parameterized complexity theory [3]. On the positive side, this problem can
be effectively solved in practice by using high-quality polynomial-time [42] and fixed-parameter-
tractable-time [40] approximation algorithms. Regrettably, not all variants of the problem of finding
optimal committees can be well-approximated. For instance, Skowron el al. [41] showed that there
exists no polynomial-time constant-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding winners
under the K+12 -median rule.
Even though the problem of finding optimal committees is computationally intractable, we can
use our findings to compare committees, even in the case of arbitrary utilities. Indeed, Proposition 5
below shows that deciding which one of the given two committees is better according to our model
is solvable in polynomial time. This observation can be used to make decisions about which from
the several shortlisted committees should be selected in a particular instance of elections, or to
derive more general conclusions about applicability of different multi-winner rules by comparing
their qualities on real data describing voters’ preferences [28].
Proposition 5. For a decision rule Rdec : N→ R, a committee S, and a utility profile 〈ui〉i∈N , the
value of the function v defined in Equation (2) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. For each voter i ∈ N and each committee S, the expected ultimate satisfaction of i from S
can be computed by dynamic programming. Let us sort the members of S in some arbitrary order,
so that S = {c1, c2, . . . , cK}. For each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ K and for each ℓ, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ K , we define the
value A[j][ℓ] as the probability that exactly ℓ members from the set {c1, . . . , cj} will vote according
to i’s preferences. Naturally, A[0][0] = 1, and for ℓ > 0, A[0][ℓ] = 0. To compute the remaining
values of the table A we can use the following relation:
A[j][ℓ] = ui,cj ·A[j − 1][ℓ− 1] + (1− ui,cj) ·A[j − 1][ℓ].
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The value of the expected ultimate satisfaction of i can be obtained by computing a linear com-
bination of the values A[K][ℓ], i.e., by computing
∑|A|
ℓ=1Rdec(ℓ) · A[K][ℓ]. This completes the
proof.
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